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When discussing national identity and its association with certain re-
ligious institutions, we often avoid the topic of secularization. On its own 
terms, secularization is linked with modernization. In secularization debates 
both sides — its supporters and opposers — agree on one issue: modernity, 
as well as technological development, contributes to the circulation of ideas, 
whether secular or religious. As a result, link between modernity and secular-
ization is incidental — any identity (including religious identity) is reinforced 
with modernization1. However, this does not mean that secularization would 
be possible without modernization. On the contrary, modernization is not 
automatically followed by secularization, but it creates favorable conditions 
for its subsistence. Thus, in order to determine how to discuss secularization, 
it is crucial to verify the presence of its precondition — modernization. Be-
sides, identifying whether a society is modern or traditional has wider signifi-
cance: it allows to measure whether the society is open or closed.
Theoretical Overview
At one glance, Georgia has long been involved in the process of mod-
ernization — there were times when the Soviet Union was considered to be as 
modern as the US or the West. But everything depends on how one defines 
modernization. If modernization only means industrialization and technical 
progress, then skepticism would not be justified. However, it is a little more 
complicated. Broadly speaking, modernization is a Western phenomenon, 
which implies transition of society from traditional to modern order. To de-
fine central characteristics of traditional and modern societies, we relied on 
two classic scholars, Max Weber and Emil Durkheim. 
As Weber would say, changes in social order, in addition to techno-
economic progress, are linked with non-traditional “ethinicity”2, mindset, and 
values.
Modern consciousness originated from the European Reformation, 
which introduced three major value changes: 
1. This worldly love became more valuable. “Traditional church, both 
Catholic and Orthodox, prioritizes love of God over this worldly love. 
Consequently, monks and nuns are more virtuous than a family man. 
Earthly love is crucial for Reformation as the most genuine expression 
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of the love of God. Family men and family, consequently, become more 
central” 3. Love of God did not become secondary, but earthly love 
became its foremost expression. 
2. Transformation of work ethics: “for traditional Christian churches 
poverty is more virtuous than affluence, while in Reformation riches 
attained as a result of hard work are blessed by God”4. 
“According to modernization theory, universalism, functional specificity and 
status attained through individual effort are dominant in modern society” 5. Hence 
it follows that taking pride in one’s nationality is absurd in modernity be-
cause it is not a personal accomplishment, one should take pride in personal 
achievements. 
3. Increased importance of personal freedom over obedience, which 
was a central virtue for traditional churches (and, accordingly, 
societies)6. 
This change augmented the value of personal responsibility, which re-
placed collective principles and to some extent, social control. If we use Dur-
kheim’s terminology, social collectivity and strong social control echo me-
chanical solidarity characteristic to homogenous societies (traditional or non-
modern). Respect for authority is crucial for traditional societies7, and eman-
cipation from it was the main goal of Reformation and the secular project. 
When we discuss modernity, we cannot disregard its most prominent 
symbol — differentiation and dissociation of fundamental institutions. Previ-
ously, religion was not detached from other social institutions (for example, 
politics, science, art). Today, whether we call it secularization or not, these 
institutions are strictly differentiated. European modernization changed so-
cial order and transformed separate human institutions so that interven-
tion is inadequate or insulting. Separate institutions, as well as links between 
them, have changed. Different public domains — “art, science, education, poli-
tics — increasingly detach themselves from religious lifestyle. This detachment is 
called secularization, or emancipation”8.
In conclusion, religion has lost its universal value in contemporary so-
ciety: it no longer defines political structure. A theory emerged that faith was 
different in traditional societies. The concept of faith corresponds to the no-
tion of plurality. Pluralism, in this case, implies more than tolerance, accep-
tance of differences — it in itself becomes part of faith9. “Faith is being ‘rela-
tivized’, that is, democracy is penetrating faith. The last product of this process is 
the conversion of faith into identity. According to contemporary sociologists, modern 
believers no longer chose a religion because of its universal validity, but in order to 
define their identity and subjectivity. New believers do not try to convert others. 
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Moreover, they do not assert superiority of their religion, but also do not tolerate 
arguments against their faith” 10.
Family, Work Ethics, Personal Freedom
As noted above, modernity is measured by at least three indicators: con-
temporary understanding of values, work ethics, and personal freedom. If we 
observe the quantitative data at hand, situation in Georgia does not look too 
bad in regard to these values. Based on 2008 World Value Survey, family is 
very important for 98,9% of Georgians. However, these findings might not be 
indicative of contemporary family image. On the one hand, the same survey 
showed that 60,8% of Georgians consider tradition as very important. On the 
other hand, unlike the modern view of family as an expression of earthly love, 
and a product of voluntary, future-oriented decisions, in our society family is 
associated with tradition and past: it is a family of father, and parents, where 
one is still an adolescent. It should not be surprising that, based on the sur-
vey, 44,6% of respondents completely agree and 45,7% agree with the idea 
that one of their primary goals is to make their parents proud11. European 
Values Study of 2008 revealed that 95,6% consider that parents deserve un-
conditional love, and the remaining 4,4% think that they should acquire their 
parents’ respect with their actions12. 
If work, just like family, is valuable in our society (in 2008, it was im-
portant to 64,1% and fairly important to 22,6%13), it is simply for material-
istic reasons, rather than its religious or public benefits. This is logical since 
only 4,2% picked the statement that “ideas stand above money” (from four 
possible choices) as their first choice, and 19,2% as their second choice14. 
Also, only 27,3% fully agreed and 32% agreed that acquiring money without 
working is humiliating15. Our national pride is also an indicator that labor 
and personal effort are not important in our society: we are very much (76%) 
or simply (21,7%) proud of our nationality16.
Freedom of choice and capacity of control, as indicators of personal 
freedom, were directly measured in a 2008 value survey. Georgian respon-
dents seem to recognize these values: more than half of them (51,7%) fully 
agree, and 40,1% agree with the statement: “I see myself as an autonomous 
individual”. Nevertheless, other questions in the survey present the issue of 
personal freedom in a different light. For example, 70,4% think that increased 
respect for authority would be a positive change (72,8% according to 2008 
European Value Survey). Only 4,6% assess this as a negative change, and 
24,9% remain neutral. Also, only 8,7% picked “less homogenous and more 
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humane society” as their first priority (from four possible choices) and 20% 
as their second priority17. 
As for privatization of religion and collective lifestyle, based on the 
data from 2008 World Value Survey, 78,2% think that the Church can solve 
family problems. It is well known that since 2007 Georgia had higher birth 
rates compared to previous years18. The Patriarch Ilia II is considered to be ac-
countable for this shift since he baptizes every third child in a family. More-
over, owing to the Patriarch’s initiative, starting from 2011, every fourth child 
in a family will be awarded the title of “A Patriot Dedicated to Fatherland 
and Protector of the Patriarch’s Throne”19.  
Differentiation of Domains
When discussing separation of secular and sacred domains, we first 
need to remember that Georgia is not an ideologically neutral country. 2002 
constitutional agreement (“Concordat”) between the Georgian Orthodox 
Church and the state grants legal privileges to the Church. The document 
recognizes the special role of the Church in Georgian history and gives it 
certain privileges in decision-making and in economic affairs20. However, as 
Sabrina Ramet notes, “the constitution is silent about practical repercussions”21. 
The Georgian Orthodox Church demanded the division of religious 
organizations into three categories. The Orthodox Church would be the only 
member of the first, privileged category; the second category would include 
“other traditional faiths”, such as Catholicism, Judaism, Islam and Armenian 
Church, which would be granted the right to exist; all other faiths would be 
unified in the third category, and would “at best, undergo strict control, if not 
a full ban”22.
Even before the “Concordat” was signed, the Georgian Orthodox 
Church had enough power and authority to impact secular events and fight 
for the establishment of its ideas in public domain. For example, Ilia Chavcha-
vadze’s famous motto, “Fatherland, Language, Faith” acquired a strong reli-
gious connotation. In 1999, a bishop from Bodbe, Father Nikoloz stated that 
genuine patriotism is not feasible without religion, and Ilia Chavchavadze 
was possibly reiterating the words of Grigol Khandzteli, a VIII-IX century 
monk23. 
On the other hand, the majority of clergy is disappointed by the agree-
ment between the state and the Church. They think that it is ineffective and 
ornamental in nature: “it does not have any real bearing because the Concordat 
does not provide practical judicial basis, it needs a judicial foundation, enforcement 
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of laws. That is to say that this agreement… there is a vacuum between it and the 
executive government, no connection”24. It must be noted that people do not 
understand the difference between sacred and secular domains. 2008 World 
Value Survey provides evidence: 58,7% think that religion can solve social is-
sues. Besides, the following statements were evaluated: 1. “politicians who do 
not believe in God, should not serve” — 51% fully agree, 32,2% agree. 2. “it 
is better if religious individuals work at public jobs” — 47,9% fully agree, and 
37,1% agree. On the contrary, 22,7% fully agree, and 28,7% agree that “reli-
gious leaders should not influence the government”. 
A good example of the Church’s intervention in public domain was 
the Patriarch’s indignation against the discussion of the Church’s decisions 
on December 17, 2010 on Davit Paichadze’s show aired on Public Broad-
casting Station25. The Patriarch stated during his sermon: “I am concerned that 
the show was transmitted on Channel One, that is, the Public Broadcasting Sta-
tion. It is even worse if it was commissioned by the state. I want to say that this is 
huge sin and will not remain unpunished. … This show was against the state and 
not against the Church. The faith of believers will not be wavered by these types 
of shows. … These are anti-national shows. … I want to warn them like a father 
warns his son, that God will not leave this unpunished and they should not ask 
later why they are being punished”26.
Although intervention in politics is the most prominent topic in today’s 
Georgia, the Georgian Orthodox Church does not disregard other domains 
either. Public education shows outward signs of the Church’s influence. Per-
sistence of the Orthodox Parents’ Union ended with the removal of Religion 
and Culture from the school program in April, 1999. The reason was that 
“the textbook devoted too much space to other religions, which according to priests, 
can confuse children”27. One month after the incident, 6th graders from a pub-
lic school, instructed by their teacher, honored their homeland and Georgian 
language. They said the Lord’s Prayer, followed by episodes from Jesus’ life, 
his teachings and church hymns. At the end, they were blessed by a priest28.
On April 8, 2005 the Georgian parliament introduced the Law on 
General Education. Article 18 addresses freedom of faith and declares that 
“religious symbols in public schools should not serve non-academic purposes”29. This 
situation angered one of the monks: “there are no icons now, and they don’t al-
low them… unfortunately, they don’t allow them to wear crosses. … Maybe not 
crosses, but at least … they made them remove the icons, they just made them re-
move them. And this is… condemnation of God starts with the condemnation of 
icons. … What does the Devil do? Separates school and that [religion] and it does 
not suit the Devil to teach God at school.” However, inspection of other public 
schools in Georgia offers a different picture: despite the law, classroom walls 
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are adorned not only with portraits of great public figures and photographs of 
Georgian churches, but also icons, and even special corners for prayer. Prayer 
rooms also exist in some universities (for example, a church was built in the 
courtyard of Tbilisi State University). 
Article 13 of the law on general education states: “use of religious indoc-
trination, proselytism or forced assimilation is forbidden in the process of educa-
tion at public schools”30. An expert on education, Simon Janashia explains that 
public schools are obliged to teach world religions in the framework of his-
tory courses. Moreover, if there is interest, schools can decide to introduce a 
course on world religions. The law also allows students to receive informa-
tion about specific religions, but this should happen only after classes or dur-
ing weekends31.
The priesthood is usually negatively disposed towards teaching other 
religions in Georgia. One archpriest explains his position: “Apostle Paul de-
clares in one of his epistles: whoever defaces the gospel and teaches it incorrectly, he 
denounces God. He says that. I don’t think it would be justified if we allowed de-
nunciation of God in our country. It is definitely not all the same to us if someone 
opens a school, where they spiritually corrupt and incorrectly interpret the gospels”32. 
In the words of one priest, “they should pray wherever they want. They should 
pray in their own countries”33. 
We also found someone with a more tolerant attitude among the in-
terviewed priests: “the teaching should simply not be compulsory. Of course, they 
need to be taught — humans should know the foundation of their national tradi-
tions, the basis of their culture, how their ancestors lived. How can you understand 
Shushanik’s life, if you do not know Orthodox Christianity? … People of all faith 
should have the opportunity to learn about their religion in school. This does not 
mean that they all should serve God, but they need to have basic knowledge. Why 
should Muslims not know about their religion? I am convinced that if they learn 
thoroughly, they will end up choosing Christianity. If you study a faith seriously, 
you start to see things differently”34.
The majority of politicians agree that ethnic and religious minorities 
should benefit from all the rights accessible to rest of the population. At the 
same time, they think that the state should not fund schools for religious mi-
norities. If religious minorities want to establish a religious school, they need 
to provide the budget. A representative of the Christian-Democratic Party 
believes that the existence of religious schools depends on the religious mi-
norities. For instance, if a religion belongs to the so-called ‘traditional con-
fession’, historically represented in Georgia and with its own parish in the 
country, then it is permitted to have a status, schools, etc. But if it is a ‘sect’, 
then its rights need to be restricted35.
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Furthermore, the Church also intervenes in art — against specific the-
atrical plays. The Patriarch easily subordinates art to religion with the fol-
lowing words: “in my opinion, we need to establish a Cultural or an Art Center 
where we will raise our new generation, our youth. … And young people who will 
be raised in this art and this faith — Orthodox faith, love, and dedication in the 
first place, this culture, — will never become drug-addicts, thieves, thugs, or any 
other wrong-doers” 36.
Religious movements also demonstrate the Church’s intervention in 
arts: protests by the Orthodox Parents’ Union ‘protected’ Georgian youth 
from Joanne Rowling’s Harry Potter, and Georgian society from Dan Brown’s 
The Da Vinci Code and its cinematization. They also demonstrated against 
several contemporary Georgian writers (i.e. Paata Shamugia’s Antitkhaosani), 
TV programs (“Wall”, “Our expert”, “Geobar”). As Ramet writes, “in West-
ern eyes, Harry Potter is a children’s magical character and a commercial success. 
However, in the eyes of the Orthodox, Harry Potter is cosmopolitanism in its worst 
form, legitimating sorcery and black magic, a challenge to Orthodox monopoly over 
the interpretation of magic and supernatural. The detestation of Harry Potter by 
Orthodox Christians is linked with general distrust of liberalism, cosmopolitanism 
and even democracy”37. 
In May, 2010 Orthodox Parents’ Union and Public Orthodox Move-
ment protested presentation of a young Georgian writer’s work, Saidumlo Si-
roba, at the bookstore of Ilia State University, and demanded a prayer room 
in the University building. Refusal to satisfy their request unleashed a wave 
of demonstrations against the University administration, and collection of 
student signatures demanding a prayer room. When part of the public held a 
peaceful gathering to support their right of expression, members of the Union 
attacked them, and subjected them to physical and verbal abuse. Police did 
not prevent the violence on behalf of the priesthood. 
A culmination of the incident took place at the office of Caucasus TV 
Channel, where the two sides were invited for a discussion: university stu-
dents and administration, as well as civil society members on the one hand, 
and the Orthodox Parents’ Union and the Public Orthodox Movement on 
the other. They raided the TV station. The incident was broadcasted on live 
television, and this time the police captured the instigators. Eight members 
of the movement, all of them priests, were brought to taken to court. Lead-
er of the Public Orthodox Movement Malkhaz Gulashvili fled Georgia and 
sought refuge in Russia. It is interesting that during the court hearings the 
accused were consoled by the priesthood. 
On May 9, a day after the television raid, the Georgian Catholicos-Pa-
triarch Ilia II awarded the Movement chair Davit Isakadze at Svetitskhoveli 
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Cathedral. “Archpriest David Isakadze, who works for the wellbeing of our na-
tion and our Church, is awarded with an embellished cross and the right to wear 
a mitre” — stated Ilia II38. A week after the incident, the Georgian Orthodox 
Church urged the government to promptly issue a law that would “properly 
protect the population from perversion, protect public and individual honor and 
dignity and their religious feelings” 39. In a statement made on May 15, the Pa-
triarch of Georgia declared that “for the past few years an active warfare was 
waged against national values and the Georgian Orthodox Church”40.
Religious Faith in Georgia
One marker of a contemporary society is a switch from traditional uni-
versalist to tolerant faith. In Georgia, 81,1% believe that there is only one true 
religion and discount the possibility that other religions can teach truth41. As 
noted by a member of the clergy, “any faith, whatever it is, derives from an as-
sumption that it is the truth. If an Evangelist says that a Baptist can obtain sal-
vation, then he is not a real Evangelist”42. In a respondent’s opinion, speaking 
about truth in other religions only emphasizes the superiority of Orthodox 
Christianity: “all other religions took the kernel of truth from Orthodox Christian-
ity. For instance, Muslims cannot deny Christ. They consider him a prophet, but … 
cannot deny him. Neither can Buddhists, they believe him to be one of the reincar-
nations of Buddha, etc. Thus, everyone adopted Christ; he could not be disregarded 
since he stands for the absolute truth” 43.
The same idea was expressed in Kviris Palitra in 1999: “according to 
leaked information from the Vatican, Virgin Mary accuses Catholic priests of vio-
lating Christian commandments, blesses Orthodox Christianity and calls for the 
unity of Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity”44. In another issue of the same 
newspaper, we are reminded that Orthodox Christianity is the only true re-
ligion since Easter’s holy fire in Jerusalem is only for Orthodox Christians45. 
Consequently, representatives of other religions in Georgia experience a lower 
level of trust: they are fully trusted by 3%, and somewhat trusted by 36,1%46. 
It must be noted, that 36,5% (more than 1/3 of the population) would not 
want to live in vicinity of a non-Christian Orthodox individual47.
There is clearly a dominant religion in Georgia: 83% of the population 
is Christian Orthodox. The second largest religious group is Muslim (11%), 
and the parish of the Armenian Apostolic Church is on the third place. Un-
conventional religious movements make up 3% of the population48. At first 
sight, church attendance is low: considering that 41% think that religion is 
really important, and 52% feel it is important, only 17% attend religious ser-
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vices49. However, it would be wrong to assume that religious life is declining 
in Georgia — if in 2008 only 16% attended religious services at least once per 
week, the number reached 22% in 2009, but declined to 17-18% in 2010-
201150. The majority of religiously active individuals lives in the capital51, and 
primarily consists of young people with higher education who grew up in 
politically and economically harsh environment of the 1990’s. On the other 
hand, even if the number of Orthodox Christians in the country is really high, 
some representatives of priesthood do not think it symbolizes strong faith: 
“today, we have a real atheism, godlessness and not war against God, — when you 
fight God, you still acknowledge his existence, but when you do not take anything 
into account, he falls out from your consciousness. Nowadays, the environment is 
more atheistic than before. We should not be fascinated, say, by the number of peo-
ple at church, or the Patriarch’s high rating… All this is a human approach — not 
a faith-based approach, but a human approach. There are positive things: they pre-
vent evil, but this is not a living faith, this is something that can be taken away 
from humans easily. In Georgian consciousness today we don’t see God, and the 
mixing that’s taking place is the worst” 52. 
Nostalgia
If we glance over the history of the Georgian Orthodox Church on the 
official website of the Patriarchate, we will notice that the last two centuries 
are practically not described: 
“In 1811 the Russian Empire illegally annulled autocephaly of the Georgian 
Church. There was ceased the post of Patriarch and the Georgian Church turned 
under rule of Synod of Russian Church. In March 1917, the Georgian clergy re-
vived the autocephaly and restored the Patriarchate. The prominent Bishop Kirion 
was elected the first Patriarch after the autocephaly restoration. 
In 1989, the Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized existence of the autocephaly 
and Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church since V century.
Since 1977 Catholicos Patriarch of All Georgia and Archbishop of Mtskheta 
and Tbilisi has been His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II”53.
The Church links its identity to the Georgian Church of the Kingdom 
of Georgia. The implication is that the Church ceased to exist after the 19th 
century annexation when its autocephaly was abolished and was revived only 
in the last years of the Soviet Union, when the Ecumenical Patriarch of Con-
stantinople approved its autocephaly. 
The Georgian Orthodox Church, one of the (if not the primary) cre-
ators of national identity, links Georgian identity to pre-modern times. The 
99
Modernization and Secularization — Georgian Case Study
clergy they often appeals (mistakenly or not) to the Middle Ages Georgia, 
past kings and their actions.
Nostalgia for the “traditional” past can be detected both in society, and 
in the Church. The past stands in opposition to the contemporary world and 
even denounces it. As noted by a member of the clergy, “unfortunately, modern 
humans have adopted European lifestyle and forget language, faith, traditions”54. 
Already in 1999, Kviris Palitra published an interview with a respected elder, 
who states: “people have become smaller even physically, not to speak about morals 
and spirituality. Such depreciation of sex, spread and rule of immorality is a more 
severe adversity than hunger … humans used to fear God in the old times” 55. Ev-
erything sinful derives from the modern Western values, otherwise “were re-
ligions ever equal in Georgia during the Time of Kings?” 56 
When asked which leadership ensured best conditions for the Geor-
gian Orthodox Church after the Soviet Union, the clergy still refers to the 
past and names King Tamara’s reign as the greatest. The desire to restore 
monarchy and appoint a king to rule Georgia is one of the best illustrations 
of the nostalgic attitude towards the past. We asked a question about the re-
vival of constitutional monarchy in Georgia during the interviewing process 
and received varied answers. 
Very few representatives of the interviewed clergy noted that monar-
chy is more of an anachronism than reality. In one case they also brought up 
Bagrationi wedding as a failed experiment. Some respondents believe that a 
king cannot have real power nowadays and would only officially hold the ti-
tle, which would depreciate the whole idea: “it is impossible today and instead 
of having a puppet, I think it is better the way it is — to govern in this manner” 57.
The majority of clergy stated that constitutional monarchy is necessary 
in Georgia, but conditions are not ripe yet. They like the prospect of having 
a king in the future, but it is impossible today since it would require serious 
preparations. They also believe that restoration of the monarchy might even 
be risky: “a king needs to be morally and spiritually ready. Unfortunately, however 
hard it is to hear this, we are in a fallen state today and this will last for years” 58. 
Third section of the clergy is in favor of establishing a constitutional 
monarchy. They believe that unlike a president, a king will rule more respon-
sibly since presidents are elected for a certain period, while kings’ power is 
hereditary. At the same time, as a God-appointed ruler, a king will protect 
Orthodox Christianity, Georgian traditions and “Georgian foundation”: “gen-
erally speaking, the idea is very good because he will be the keystone of Georgianness, 
traditions, which are merged with Christianity and Orthodoxy; ennobled, and a 
savior of the Georgian nation. A king needs to be a defender. Unfortunately, now-
adays, throughout these years, I haven’t felt that these ideas are being defended” 59. 
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King will also incorporate functions that only the Church is responsible for. 
However, the Church will exercise control over the monarchy. During the 
monarchy, the king will be a mediator between the Church and the state. To 
put it differently, the clergy imagined the state and the Church in a union: 
“king and church do not exist separately. But the ideology needs to be Orthodox. It 
is our tradition, our faith, it is essential. […] There is a prophecy that a king will 
lead Georgia. This is a prophecy” 60.
It is worth noting that the majority of politicians positively assess the 
prospect of a monarchy. For the New Right monarchy is the only cornerstone 
of political ideology. They believe that only the Church is capable of raising 
an individual who can unify Georgia61. The National Forum is also an active 
supporter of monarchy. Respondent #1 stresses the role of the king in the 
process of unification. Also, he emphasizes the value of close ties between 
the future king and the Church. Respondent #7 from the Christian-Dem-
ocratic Party believes that constitutional monarchy will allow reinforcement 
and protection of traditions, which is crucial today when society is facing so 
many challenges. It is interesting that the Laborist Party and a democratic 
movement — the United Georgia, also support the revival of monarchy. Par-
ties that clearly do not approve are the United National Movement, the Re-
publican Party and the New Democrats. 
Royal wedding between two branches of Bagrationi family, welcomed 
by certain political powers, benefitted the prospect of a monarchy. Both reli-
gious and political circles were disappointed and regretful when the Bagra-
tioni couple separated. An interview with achrimandrite Ilia Nasidze pub-
lished in Kviris Palitra states: “monarchs would often marry without love when 
the nation needed it… But it looks like neither Bagrationis nor Georgian society 
is ready for monarchy” 62. Nasidze noted with regret that Bagrationis were not 
able to create a strong family and give birth to an heir to the throne. In the 
same article, leader of the Traditionalist Union, Akaki Asatiani, suggested 
that Vano Merabishvili and the ruling power envy the Church. He advises 
them to change their approach, since the only solution lies in the Church63. 
Asatiani believes that Bagrationi wedding was rushed, and required better 
preparation. He adds that he had a premonition that they (the ruling power) 
would come up with a silly gossip in order to discredit the event64.
The contrast between the present world and the good old past times is 
also emphasized in arts: certain music genres, especially rock, are considered 
to be “linked with the Lucifer”, while some movies are viewed as sacrilege65. 
1999 issue of Kviris Palitra writes: “listening to all music genres and watching all 
types of movies can easily “pollute” our consciousness without our ears and eyes no-
ticing it” 66. This attitude persists today, as evidenced by the Patriarch’s speech 
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on December 12, 2010: “in the past, music would ennoble humans, now it de-
stroys them. There is music and there is anti-music” 67. 
As a final point, attitude towards the most pronounced trait of moder-
nity — technological progress and free flow of information, is also interest-
ing. The Georgian Orthodox Church does not welcome these changes, and 
often discusses scientific and technological achievements as a means of ex-
ercising mass psychological influence68. As the Patriarch stated in 1999, fast 
development of science and technology caused nihilism and indifference in 
developed countries, resulting in spiritual development lagging behind tech-
nological progress69. On Sunday sermon of December 26, 2004, Ilia II clearly 
declared that globalization processes threaten the existing lifestyle and val-
ue system: “for the past few years, humans acquired a lot of knowledge. I empha-
size — a lot of knowledge, but not deep knowledge; and along with that, a relative-
ly superficial mindset. Humans evaluate everything superficially in science, culture, 
and everyday life; they care for today as if the future does not exist. For example, 
if you ask students from a secondary school, they will list painters, composers, espe-
cially contemporary singers — our youth is captivated by modern music. However, 
unfortunately, their answers will be superficial, they will lack depth. Our ances-
tors were different. They knew less, but they thought more and their judgment was 
thorough. This helped them a lot” 70. 
Conclusion 
Studying Georgia in the context of modern theories is often challeng-
ing since the topic has not been well researched. In this regard, modern values 
are especially significant — particularly, measuring religious influences and, 
identifying disparities between old and new perceptions. The information we 
have at hand today allows us to come up with certain conclusions. 
Firstly, it is worth noting that Georgian population is still not modern, 
if not traditional. “This means that we are in a transitional stage and do not fully 
belong to any system. To some extent, we are dealing with a system of hybrid values, 
which can be explained not only by deteriorating socio-economic conditions of the 
past twenty years, … but also the fact that modernization implemented in the So-
viet Union significantly differed from the Western modernization model” — notes 
Giga Zedania71. 
An accidentally odd situation emerged as a result of the Rose Revo-
lution. On the one hand, reforms introduced by government can be consid-
ered as an attempt at modernizing the state and society. On the other hand, 
the Georgian Orthodox Church is more apparently condescending of mod-
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ern values, and in these circumstances, is the most high-ranked institution in 
Georgia. Consequently, there is a conflict between the modernization project 
and traditional values72. 
Veneration of the past is not unique to the Georgian Orthodox Church. 
However, contest for power and a simultaneous constitutional link with the 
state, is characteristic to it only. Existence of the “Concordat” is not consis-
tent with the Index on Religious Freedom, which states that no religion can 
be privileged73. 
As we have seen, no objectives associated with modernization are be-
ing implemented in today’s Georgia. Family has a sacred value — 95,8% be-
lieve that it would be beneficial to emphasize family life in political agen-
da74. Western work ethic promotes appreciation of wealth and status acquired 
through one’s labor. In contrast, wealth acquired via other means (and not 
through labor) is still valued in today’s Georgia. At the same time, simple 
poverty is viewed as virtuous, and nationality as something to be proud of. 
Respect for authority still overshadows personal freedoms. 
Contemporary model of faith advocates pluralistic approach and pro-
hibits proselytism. In Georgia, however, trust and tolerance are problematic 
due to the belief that only the Orthodox Church professes truth and conse-
quently, all other religions are dangerous. In addition to this, the Church is 
gradually becoming more intensively and legitimately (in the sense that it is 
perceived as a norm) involved in social, cultural, and political life. In these 
circumstances, it is hard to imagine that religion has adjusted to modernity, 
or that it has given up its monopoly over “the truth”. 
Sergo Ratiani calls the intervention in public and secular domains, as 
well as overall religiosity of post-Soviet individuals, a reactionary movement, 
and describes it with Nietzschean sentiments: “it is spite, harm, revenge, but 
not in its pure form, rather combined with powerlessness” 75. It is reactive because 
it is a belated response, an action postponed for the future (better times) and 
not implemented when it was logically required. Ressentiment is always in-
dicative of fear and helplessness. Its existence in the contemporary world 
can only signify contradiction: subjects who experience ressentiment favor 
past primates over present ones, and simultaneously, are not bothered by us-
ing modern — that is, the opponent’s — tools (technology, communication 
means). Accordingly, “modernization without introduction of modern values will 
turn modernity into an incomplete project” 76.
As Sergo Ratiani suggests, “we do not want ecological pollution, but also 
do not want to contribute to the process; we want to be materially well-established, 
but do not want to work; we want to be believers but we not only reject religious 
lifestyle, but also are reluctant to learn about our faith” 77. This can be explained 
103
Modernization and Secularization — Georgian Case Study
by our past, and specifically by Soviet “form of modernization, which did not 
bring about modernity. … The core principles of this concept were foreign to the 
system — personal freedom, property acquired via labor, success and its superior-
ity over the cult of poverty, private life, and dedication to near relations; not just 
general, indefinite values, demythologization, desacralization, rationalization and 
many other” 78.
As a result, modernization process in Georgia did not originate from 
natural social development. Since it was externally introduced, it functioned 
and continues to function only superficially, without its core values. Conse-
quently, secularization (meaning differentiation of domains) is an unstable 
process even when certain domains are set apart (for instance, religion and 
politics). All this originates from and is reinforced by unripe modern values 
in society. 
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